Abstract. The paper aims to show how regional policy-makers can stimulate firms' co-operation with research organizations by granting an R&D subsidy. Using an original dataset for the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna, propensity score matching is first applied to identify the impact of the subsidy received.Ageneralized propensity score technique is then employed to investigate the effect of an increasing amount of support. The firm's co-operation is policy sensitive. The award of a subsidy to regional firms affects their intra-regional more than their extra-regional co-operation. The propensity toward the latter appears subject to a monetary effect and is influenced by the amount of public funding received providing the subsidy overcomes a minimum threshold.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the background literature pertinent to the paper is reviewed. The characteristics of our empirical application are presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides a discussion of the results. Section 5 concludes.
Literature review
Co-operation between firms and research organizations is one of the channels through which science is linked to technology and leads to industrial innovation (Mansfield 1991 (Mansfield , 1995 Mansfield and Lee 1996) . Through it, firms access new upstream knowledge, benefit from research spillovers and share the risks and costs of their innovative projects (Cassiman and Veugelers 2002) . Furthermore, by crossing the boundaries of the business (social) system, firms exchange formerly unrelated information and communication standards with the science (social) system and reinforce their innovativeness (Kaufmann and Tödtling 2001) .
Given their important impact on innovation, relationships between firms and research organizations -both in the form of 'engagement' (e.g., collaborative and contract research, consulting, and informal knowledge transfer) and 'commercialization' (e.g., of academic patents and entrepreneurial ideas) -have received a lot of attention in innovation studies (for a review, see Perkmann et al. 2013) . A parallel interest in regional/urban studies and economic geography has attracted the 'regionalization' of industry-research co-operation and the regional concentration of its effects (Fritsch and Schwirten 1999; Fritsch 2001; Ponds et al. 2007) .
The basic idea is that these research collaborations are an important channel for both unintended knowledge spillovers and deliberated forms of knowledge access (Massard and Mehier 2009; D'Este et al. 2013) , leading firms to superior innovation performances at the local level. However, the internal mechanisms through which industry-research co-operation works at the local level are not completely recognized yet. In particular, further investigation is required due to the effects of the manifold distance that separates firms and research organizations (Boschma 2005) -that is, geographical, institutional, cognitive, and social -and due to the possibility that the partners' proximity in one of these dimensions could compensate for their distance in another. This analysis is essential to better understanding the barriers to industryresearch co-operation and to evaluating the policy interventions that could mitigate such barriers.
First of all, regarding knowledge production and intellectual property, firms and research organizations have different objectives and incentive structures, as they belong to different 'social systems ' (Kaufmann and Tödtling 2001; Ponds et al. 2007; Valentin and Jensen 2007) . When compared to inter-firm collaborations, ceteris paribus, industry-research co-operation is characterized by a lower institutional proximity (Boschma 2005) . On the one hand, this distance can bring about novelty and variety in both firms' internal routines and external interfaces, and favour the occurrence of even more radical forms of innovation (Kaufmann and Tödtling 2001) . On the other hand, however, if it becomes excessive, and/or if it is not compensated by other proximities, this kind of distance could prevent effective co-operation. In this latter case, the access to the world of science could entail substantial implicit and explicit co-ordination costs to business (e.g., for firms to set up ad hoc communication procedures), which a policy intervention could contribute to alleviating.
Industry-research co-operation can be similarly affected by low levels of cognitive proximity between partners, given the distance separating their specialized knowledge bases (Nesta and Saviotti 2005) . A low cognitive proximity can spur novel solutions and help firms to access other firms' knowledge, to 'simply' combine it with their internal one (Balconi et al. 2012) . However, in the case of firms that interact with research organizations for the sake of active mutual learning, this distance is not necessarily an advantage. While it is an input for the exploration of new knowledge, the co-operation with cognitively distant research organizations poses higher exploitation costs to firms (Nooteboom 2000) (i.e., in terms of processing, understanding and absorbing external knowledge), which a policy intervention could also alleviate. All in all, an excessively low level of both institutional and cognitive proximity between the partners could determine relevant costs for an effective industry-research co-operation. As these costs could affect innovative outcome, this kind of co-operation requires a policy intervention. For example, a regional R&D subsidy, especially if it includes industry-research co-operation among the activities eligible for public funding, could serve the case and have a significant 'additional' impact on the relative behaviours.
At the regional level, the previously listed kinds of proximity interact with an additional two, on which 'innovation geography' has come to focus (Breschi and Lissoni 2001) : geographical and social proximity. Their interplay enriches the analysis of the barriers to research co-operation and poses further testable implications, on which we will focus in our empirical application.
At the outset, the collaboration between firms and research organizations entails bi-directional/reciprocal information exchanges. It thus requires intense codification and de-codification efforts concerning tacit and explicit knowledge, respectively, for which face-toface contact is crucial. In brief, industry-research co-operation in principle benefits from geographical (or spatial) proximity (Ponds et al. 2007; D'Este and Iammarino 2010) . On the other hand, whether geographical proximity helps per se, or rather if it is moderated and complemented by the social proximity between the partners has recently been questioned (Breschi and Lissoni 2006) . In local systems of production/innovation, and industrial clusters in particular, short physical distances among firms and research organizations combine with their belonging to social networks of interpersonal ties which support their co-operation as they are 'acquainted' with each other and rely on their respective reputations (Granovetter 1985) . Quite interestingly, when this social proximity is separately disentangled from geographical proximity, it appears to have a relatively higher impact on research collaborations (Autant-Bernard et al. 2007; Maggioni et al. 2007; D'Este et al. 2013) .
The previous arguments have important implications for a firm's decision to co-operate with extra-regional research partners. Crossing the regional boundaries entails a general decrease in firms' proximities to research organizations. Co-operation costs can thus be expected to be higher for extra-regional interactions than for intra-regional ones. The extent to which this actually occurs and the actual wedge between intra and extra-regional co-operation costs is, of course, region-specific.
2 However, irrespective of these specificities, and of the different needs of extra-regional co-operation that the regional knowledge base poses to firms, some general patterns can be expected to occur.
First of all, the geographical distance in general increases, though the weight of shorterdistance, cross-border interactions should be controlled. The opportunity cost of access to knowledge (Andersson and Ejermo 2004) increases, as does the average time-distance cost of access to research. More in general, personal interaction and tacit knowledge diffusion become more difficult also in terms of unintended knowledge spillovers (Boschma 2005, p. 69) .
Extra-regional co-operation is also likely to entail an increased social distance between the partners. This is particularly the case for regions that are marked by idiosyncratic socioeconomic networks, such as those of Emilia-Romagna, the Italian region we are going to investigate in our empirical application (see Section 3). In this case, firms and research organizations, along with other social actors, are part of region-specific forms of territorial organiza-tion -the so-called, industrial district-based, Emilian model (Brusco 1982 ) -whose advantages are lost in leaving the 'local buzz' to enter into the 'global pipeline' (Massard and Mehier 2009) . Although this could be a source of industrial renewal for local firms -as we will later discuss -it comes with an increase in co-ordination and social communication costs.
The cognitive distance between the co-operating partners also experiences an increase when the partners are in different regions. In this case partners do not share the same regional knowledge base, which has accumulated over time through regional firms' investments in technological and production activities; the adoption of region-specific 'innovation modes' (Asheim 2012; Asheim and Coenen 2005, 2006) ; and the regional co-evolution of economic, technological and institutional forces (Boschma and Frenken 2006; Uyarra 2010) . The region of EmiliaRomagna, for example, has been developing a RIS whose techno-economic specialization and research-knowledge base has been revealed as different, even from other RISs in Italy (Evangelista et al. 2002) . As we will also state below, tapping into RISs (or learning regions) with different specialization patterns could make the region more innovative. However, being embedded in a 'unique' innovation and specialization milieu, regional firms are required to make additional investments (e.g., in R&D and training) in order to access the knowledge of extra-regional research organizations. This phenomenon becomes truer the more cognitively distant the regions where the partners are located (e.g., backward vs. frontier regions).
Finally, the different ways in which the governance structures of different RISs regulate and/or assist industry-research co-operation (Cooke 2001) could pose additional administration costs to the regional firms spanning the regional boundaries of their interactions and setting them to work in different institutional set-ups. Institutional proximity also decreases to a greater extent when extra-regional co-operation is also international and could entail 'liability of foreignness' issues (Zaheer 1995; Tallman and Phene 2007) .
All in all, we can say that crossing the regional borders with co-operation implies a sharp decrease (a sort of negative 'shift') in the level of proximity between regional firms and their partners. In turn, this is expected to generate a 'discontinuity' in the variation of co-operation costs from regional to extra-regional collaborations.
3 This consideration leads us to a first testable implication. In the absence of alternative incentives (e.g., larger funding for extraregional over intra-regional co-operation), firms would react to an R&D subsidy (supporting their co-operation, in general) by increasing more their propensity for co-operation with regional, than with extra-regional research organizations. For the aforementioned reasons, such a subsidy can be expected to make regional co-operation more readily economic viable and successful. Following a 'behavioural additionality' perspective, the simple administration of an R&D subsidy (regardless of the amount of support) can be expected to make funded firms more prone to interact with regional research organizations than with extra-regional ones, when compared to 'non-treated' firms.
A second testable implication concerning extra-regional collaborations follows from the flipside of the proximity argument. As we anticipated in all the previous respects, both the interplay of regional proximities and the regional behavioural additionality of subsidyadministration could make the region a 'sticky place' (Markusen 1996) for firms that are willing to co-operate with research partners. Regional firms could lose sight of the different (and possibly new) market and technological opportunities generated by more distant partners in other regions and/or in other countries (e.g., D'Este and Iammarino 2010). The regional knowledge base, which has possibly been useful in the past, could become obsolete with respect to the outer environment (Lambooy and Boschma 2001 ) and a potential source of 'lock-in' for the RIS (Giuliani 2005; Hassink 2005 ).
For these reasons, supporting extra-regional co-operation with research organizationsboth within and outside national boundaries -becomes essential in order to overcome a potential 'competence trap', which could turn into an inefficient pattern of regional specialization (for more on this issue, see the debate on the so-called 'local buzz ' and 'global pipelines'; Bathelt et al. 2004; Moodysson 2008; Trippl et al. 2009 ). The creation or consolidation of 'open regional innovation systems' (Belussi et al. 2010) , in which local firms open up to extra-regional partners, emerges as a policy priority in this last respect. Accordingly, a policy of compensation to regional firms for the higher costs they will face becomes crucial. The amount of an R&D subsidy could play an important role. In other words, unlike the 'administration effect', the 'monetary effect' of the subsidy (Broekel 2012) can extend the degree of freedom that the recipient firm has in using it to increase engagement in extraregional co-operation.
Empirical application
The empirical application we carry out refers to the north-eastern Italian region (NUTS 2 level) of Emilia-Romagna (ER). The region has a population of nearly 4.5 million people and accounts for about 9 per cent of national GDP (our elaborations on 'Istat -GeoDemo Statistics', 'IstatRegional Economic Accounts', and 'Eurostat -Regional Statistics Database').
As revealed by the 'history' of its comparative advantages (Vertova 2005; Brasili et al. 2011 ), its production structure -with specializations in traditional industries (e.g., ceramics), medium high-tech sectors (e.g., mechanics and machinery) and high-tech sectors (e.g., biomedical devices and mechatronics) -is different from that of other regional partitions of the country and, though to a lesser extent, from that of the other north-eastern Italian regions. An interplay between economic activities and social relations is also typical of ER, and has been identified as the 'Emilian model' (Brusco 1982) . As is well-known, this has evolved into a RIS whose industrial structure is mainly made up of a set of different industrial districts, located in different municipalities within the region (Cooke et al. 1997) . Together with the institutional set-up and the research sub-system of the region, these industrial districts have contributed to the successful evolution of ER RIS.
In terms of innovation, together with Lombardy, ER is the only medium-high innovator in the country (Antonioli et al. 2011; Hollanders et al. 2009) , and is surrounded by only average and medium-low innovators.
4 When compared with the other European regions (considering publishing and patenting intensity, along with R&D), the ER research system appears relatively more reliant on public R&D, as are other Italian regions. However, when more specific aspects are considered, it clusters together with only 5 of the other 20 Italian regions (Kroll and Stahlecker 2009) . Further differentiation emerges from CIS (Community Innovation Survey) data (Evangelista et al. 2002) . Unlike 'technologically backward regions' (mainly in the south), 'moderately innovative regions' and 'R&D based innovative regions', ER appears as a particular 'informal learning RIS'. A plurality of institutional actors plays a role (e.g., specialized business service providers, governmental agencies, technology-transfer centres, and business associations) in this, but their innovative interactions are mainly informal.
All in all, there is evidence of regional 'discontinuities' in the different proximities that we have addressed above. Although with some caveats, this holds true also for geographical proximity. With respect to ER's partners, extra-regional partners can be generally deemed more distant in geographical terms too.
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Innovation policy interventions play an important role in the ER RIS (Bianchi and Giordani 1993) . A remarkable example is represented by the 'Regional Programme for Industrial Research, Innovation and Technology Transfer' (PRRIITT), launched for the first time in 2003 (Marzocchi 2009 ). Its aim is to mitigate the weaknesses of the RIS, while exploiting its specific strengths.
Our analysis is based on this policy scheme. In particular, we focus on the first two calls (February and September 2004) of the 'Measure 3.1 A'. This measure was devised to sustain industrial research and precompetitive development with a focus on more detailed objectives, such as support to specific technological areas, employment in industrial research, technology transfer from actors involved in scientific research, the adoption of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) forms of protection for innovative outputs. Furthermore and specifically related to the aim of our research, policy-makers also intended to strengthen the linkages between firms and universities and/or research institutes.
With respect to the goal of supporting industry-research co-operation (both regional and extra-regional), the subsidy had a hybrid nature. On the one hand, financial support formally had the characteristics of a 'generic' intervention, leaving firms free to decide whether or not to actually engage in any collaboration with a university or a research institute (and the specific partner to interact with), or to use the funding differently. On the other hand, even if not specifically 'conditioned' to industry-research co-operation, the subsidy was designed to support these types of interactions, both on regional and extra-regional levels. Among the technicalscientific aspects to be considered in the evaluation process for granting the subsidies, policymakers included a point that explicitly concerned co-operation with research partners. 6 As a further support, firms were provided with a higher percentage of contribution for expenditures related to collaboration with universities and research institutes. Specifically, whereas the maximum coverage of the subsidy was fixed at 50 per cent of the overall cost for industrial research activities, and at 25 per cent (35% for SMEs) of the total cost for precompetitive development actions, specific expenditures for industry-research collaborations (both related to research and development activities) were potentially covered by up to 80 per cent.
As for the general characteristics of the subsidy implementation, 529 projects (557 firms) 7 were subsidized through the two calls. Although both SMEs and large firms were allowed to participate in the scheme, the limited amount of the average regional contribution (175,000 Euros per project) made the subsidy more oriented towards the former category (see also Table  B1 in the Appendix). The total cost of the subsidized projects was about 236 million Euros. Public funding covered about 40 per cent of the total cost, with an overall public expenditure of 96 million Euros. Regional contribution ranged from about 61,000 to 250,000 Euros (the maximum contribution amount set by policy-makers).
Data
Empirical application relies on a unique dataset. First, by focusing on a single region, we have been able to obtain detailed information from its policy-makers on the amounts and characteristics of the investigated policy scheme. This information has been integrated with other two firm-level data sources. The first is an original survey, with a structure similar to the Eurostat Community Innovation Survey (CIS), carried out in 2009 by Antonioli et al. (2011) on 555 ER manufacturing firms (with at least 20 employees). The second dataset is the AIDA database, by BureauVanDijk, which we used to extract firms' balance-sheet data.
More specifically, the first dataset contains detailed information on structural and organizational characteristics of the surveyed firms and on their innovation outcomes and strategies. Their research co-operation activities are among these.
The survey refers to a random sample of 555 firms and is stratified by size, province (geographic location at NUTS 3 level) and sector (NACE Rev. 1.1). The reference years are 2006-2008, a time span subsequent to the onset of policy administration, while some of the data that we use is (supposedly) time-invariant. On the other hand, balance-sheet data (for example, intramural R&D and advertising expenditures) refer to the year 2003, before the policy was in force.
After merging and cleaning procedures, we were left with a longitudinal sample of 408 manufacturing firms: 99 subsidized, and 309 non-subsidized with the PRRIITT Measure 3.1A. The 99 firms show a distribution by size (SMEs and large firms) and sector (Pavitt/OECD taxonomy) similar to that of all the manufacturing firms (with more than 20 employees) that received the regional R&D subsidy (Table B1) .
Econometric strategy
The strategy we use for the first part of the analysis is established in empirical literature on the impact of the 'simple' administration of an R&D subsidy (e.g., Czarnitzki and Licht 2006; Busom and Fernandez-Ribas 2008; Fernandez-Ribas and Shapira 2009) .
Given the non-exogeneity of policy support (on which see Cerulli 2010) , and the related problems of an ordinary least squares model, the estimation of its impact can make use of a propensity score matching (PSM) approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) . In brief, the PSM tries to obtain an estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of the policy, defined as:
.
Y1 and Y0 denote the value of a certain outcome variable (Y) in the presence and absence of the treatment (policy, in this case), respectively. D denotes the status of the treatment:
is by definition non-observable. Therefore, it needs to be substituted by referring to a suitable 'counter-factual' of firms that did not receive financial support by way of the policy. In order to control for the selection-bias (on observables), and be sure that the difference in the outcome of the two groups is exclusively due to the policy, treated firms are matched with non-treated firms on the basis of the propensity score, Pr(D = 1|X) (or P(X) ). This represents the probability of being treated, given a set of pre-treatment characteristics, X, which are supposed to affect both the treatment and the outcome. The PSM estimate of ATT is thus given by:
where P(X) is estimated with a probit model. The PSM is implemented through use of a set of standard procedures, assumptions and quality tests. In brief, a set of matching procedures is employed, allowing us to assess the stability and, indirectly, the reliability of the evidence. These procedures differ in the selection and weighting of the non-treated firms to be used as matches, as well as in the capacity to trade between efficiency and bias reduction (Becker and Ichino 2002; Smith and Todd 2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008; Cameron and Trivedi 2009) . The common support condition is imposed in all the matching procedures, in order to guarantee the presence of suitable counterfactual firms for each treated. 8 Finally, the quality of the matching is tested by verifying that the beneficiaries and the matched controls are correctly aligned with respect to the vector of the covariates X. In order to test for the 'monetary effect' of the subsidy in the second part of the empirical application, we make use of an original 'continuous treatment' approach: the generalized propensity score method (GPS) (Hirano and Imbens 2004; Bia and Mattei 2008) . In particular, the GPS is used to estimate the effect of an additional amount of public funding for a set of subsidy levels. In technical terms, given the treatment, T, and a set of covariates, X, which explain its administration, the generalized propensity score, R, is defined as (Hirano and Imbens 2004) :
where the propensity function r(t,x) is the conditional density of the actual treatment, t, given the observed covariates, x. Like the propensity score, the GPS has a balancing property. 10 Hirano and Imbens (2004) have demonstrated that, when this balancing propriety is associated with a suitable unconfoundedness assumption, the treatment is unconfounded given the GPS. Hence, the GPS can be used to eliminate the bias in the estimation of the treatment effect, which is due to differences in the covariates.
In empirical application, following Hirano and Imbens (2004) and Bia and Mattei (2008) , we follow a three-step estimation strategy, which Appendix A illustrates in detail. However, at this stage it is worthwhile to clarify two of its specific elements. First of all, our interest is in the effect that an extra amount of subsidy has on a set of co-operation decisions which have a discretely increasing order: no-co-operation, co-operation with a regional partner, and co-operation with an extra-regional partner. Therefore, step 2 (see Appendix A) of the GPS strategy is estimated with an ordered probit model. Second, the choice of treatment variation for analysing the incremental effects of the policy inevitably suffers from ad hocness. However, this problem is attenuated through the choice of this variation according to the characteristics of the investigated context. As the average regional contribution was equal to 175,000 Euros, Δt has been heuristically looked for among a set of options and chosen at 20,000 Euros.
11 Furthermore, given the minimum and maximum amount of subsidy granted to the firms, the treatment levels to which such a Δt has been applied spans from 60,000 to 250,000 Euros. 8 In addition to the 'minima and maxima' comparison, the five nearest-neighbours matching is implemented by also imposing the common support condition with a 1 per cent 'trimming' procedure (see Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008) . 9 Three tests have been carried out (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008) : a joint significance and a pseudo-R 2 test for the PSM probit, and a regression-based t-test on the differences in the covariates means. The results of these tests, available upon request, largely support the quality of the matching procedures.
10 Within strata with the same value of r(t,x), the probability that T = t does not depend on X. 11 This is approximately the cost of an extra temporary contract of 12 months for a junior researcher in a typical regional university/institute department. As a robustness check, we carried out our analysis with different values of Δt, namely 1.00 Euro, 1,000 Euros, and 40,000 Euros.
Variables
We build up two sets of variables. First, we need a set of suitable covariates, X, to be included in the estimation of the propensity score and in that of the GPS. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table B2 . Sector-specific and scale-specific effects in innovation are first controlled for by considering a set of dummies (PAVITT1 -PAVITT5) for the Pavitt/OECD sectors, and (the natural logarithm of) the firms' numbers of employees (lnEMP2003), respectively. Furthermore, provincial (NUTS 3 level) dummies (GEO1-GE010) are considered to account for the geographical heterogeneity of the ER region.
In addition to these time-invariant controls, the dataset allowed us to consider two pre-policy features (that is, in place in 2003) that could have affected policy administration (in 2004): the firms' innovativeness and their financial situations. The first is proxied by per capita expenditures in intramural R&D and advertising (RDADV2003).
12 Our expectation is that firms with higher R&D intensity are more willing to apply for and use the subsidy to make further steps along their path toward innovation. The financial situation of the firm is proxied by its per capita cash-flow (CASHFLOW2003) -accounting for the firm's internal financial resources to invest in innovation -and by its short-term debt index (FINCONST2003) -signalling the presence of possible financial constraints. 13 Our expectation is that smaller (larger) financial resources (barriers) will make firms more prone to apply for the subsidy.
We should note that, apart from the sectoral and geographical dummies, all the considered covariates are continuous variables. This fact enhances the quality of the estimates. Furthermore, nearly all of them are used in the specification of both the propensity score and the GPS. Only few of them had to be dropped to respect the balancing propriety of the latter: the provincial dummies (GEO1-GEO10) and the expenditure in R&D and advertising in year 2003 (RDADV2003).
The second set of necessary variables are related to the outcome of the policy in terms of research co-operation. Following the definition employed in the survey, this co-operation refers to the active participation of firms in joint innovation projects (not confined to R&D only), which are carried out together with other organizations (both public and private). Hence the externalization of innovation activities, the acquisition of licences and patents, as well as sporadic participation in informal networks are excluded from our analysis.
At the outset, we distinguish research organizations as universities and research institutes.
14 This is consistent with literature (e.g., Tödtling et al. 2009 ), in which the specific type of partner can have a role in determining the co-operative-additionality of the policy. More precisely, we first consider whether, in the aftermath of the policy (period 2006-2008) , firms had co-operation agreements in place with: regional universities (COOPUNIREG) and research institutes (COOPRESINSREG); extra-regional universities (COOPUNIEXTRA) and research institutes (COOPRESINSEXTRA). Descriptive statistics of the outcome variables (see Table B3 ) provide some preliminary insights which will be consolidated through the implementation of the econometric strategy described in subsection 3.2. On average, ER firms in our sample co-operate more 12 Unfortunately, disaggregated data for the two kinds of expenditures were not available. However, recent studies are emerging on their complementary in the current open-innovation and demand-led paradigm (e.g., Perks et al. 2009 ).
13 Short-term debt is considered here to be more relevant than long-term debt, given the contingent nature of the decision to plan an R&D project and thus apply for a subsidy.
14 Given the characteristics of policy assignment rules, we here refer to universities and research institutes without distinguishing between private and public. The support to industry-research co-operation was not conditioned to the public nature of research partners. While this makes private partners in co-operation less distant from firms in micro-institutional terms, important differences remain between them in terms of both incentives and objectives. A further reason for not distinguishing between private and public research partners is the relatively low number of public research institutes in the region (limited to those of the National Research Council (CNR) and of the Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic Development (ENEA)), which is also reflected in our dataset.
with regional partners than with extra-regional ones. Furthermore, funded firms are more engaged in industry-research collaboration than non-subsidized firms. In the second part of the application we make use of two ordinal variables (COOPUNIORD and COOPRESINSORD) which, in the post-policy period (2006) (2007) (2008) , account for the range of the firms' interaction. Each of these variables takes value 0, in the case of no co-operation, 1, in the case of regional co-operation, and 2, in the case of extra-regional co-operation with at least one university or research institute, respectively.
Results
Before looking at PSM estimates, let us consider underlying probit estimation ( Table 1) .
As expected, R&D support has a higher probability of being searched for/received by firms with a larger experience in R&D investment (RDADV2003).
15 Furthermore, firms operating in more dynamic and technology-intensive sectors are more likely to be subsidized. In addition to scale-intensive firms (PAVITT4), science-based companies (PAVITT3) and firms operating in the industrial-districts of the ER region, characterized by specialized supplier sectors (PAVITT5), have a higher probability of receiving the subsidy. Finally, a solid financial condition increases the firms' probability of being funded (FINCONST2003 is significantly negative). In synthesis, the subsidy appears to be a 'picking the winner' policy in its nature (Cerulli 2010) , helping innovative ER firms to breed their success in innovation . 16 Clearly, such a result is an expected outcome of the selection criteria followed in granting the R&D subsidy (see Section 3). The regional policy-maker, although not explicitly excluding firms with low business and innovative performance, de facto favoured the best performing firms, by providing them with premiums for technological, economic and managerial excellence.
As a further introduction to our analysis, Table 2 shows that the ATT of the policy is generally positive and significant. This result is robust across the different matching procedures employed. Funded firms are more likely to co-operate than non-funded ones, irrespective of the nature of the research partner and its location. The subsidy is actually able to compensate recipient firms for the co-operation costs that are entailed by the institutional and cognitive distances which separate firms from research organizations in general. In particular, firms appear to make use of the degree of freedom that the hybrid nature of the public intervention leaves to them (see Section 3). Given the weaknesses of the investigated RIS, especially in terms of lack of formal and structured links between firms and research actors (e.g., Evangelista et al. 2002) , this result suggests an 'illuminated' action on the part of ER policy-makers.
Turning to the research focus of the paper, regional boundaries and the manifold discontinuity they generate actually affect the impact of the policy. Compared to non-funded firms, funded ones are more likely to co-operate with regional (from +37.4% to +40.2%, depending on the matching procedure) than with extra-regional universities (from +13.0% to +19.8%). The same holds true in the case of regional and extra-regional research institutes (from +32.8% to +33.5%, and from +19.3% to +22.6%, respectively).
This result is also robust and confirms the theoretical argument developed in Section 2 and its policy implications. The manifold proximity that the regional setting provides (geographical, 16 provide an analysis of the same R&D subsidy here investigated. However, it differs from the present paper in two main respects. First, differently from the present analysis, the one provided by does not focus on policy effects that pertain to the intended objectives of the policy intervention. Whereas industry-research co-operation was an explicit policy target (see Section 3), the impacts analysed by (i.e., competences upgrading and inter-firm co-operation) did not receive the same type of policy support. Second, due to a further process of data collection, in the present analysis we make use of information on the amount of policy funding and consequently employ a novel econometric method (i.e., GPS) to investigate the 'monetary effect' of the subsidy. cognitive, social and institutional) favours firms' research co-operation. Hence, given the lower barriers and costs, closer co-operation is actually easier to enhance by simple participation in the policy scheme. In spite of the overall regionalization of its effects, it remains true that the policy has some additionality in terms of extra-regional co-operation too. Given the role that this kind of relationship plays in opening up the RIS by allowing the regional firms to renew the local knowledge base (e.g., Hassink 2005), this is another very welcomed result of the policy in this RIS.
Examining the monetary effect of the policy, our theoretical argument does find confirmation in GPS estimates, although with some important specifications. 17 An increment of the R&D subsidy significantly and increasingly affects the firm's propensity to extend its co-operation with research organizations beyond regional borders (Y = 2 in Tables 3 and 4 ). However, this occurs when the subsidy overcomes a minimum threshold. By considering an increase of 20,000 (40,000) Euros, this threshold is 200,000 (180,000) Euros with respect to research institutes (Table 3) , and 180,000 (160,000) Euros, with respect to universities (Table 4) .
This result is quite interesting and suggests the following interpretation: the sharp decrease that crossing regional boundaries determines in the firms' 'proximities' with their research 17 The maximum likelihood estimation of the GPS is reported in the Appendix (Table B4) . In what follows, we report and comment on the results obtained with Δt values of 20,000 Euros and 40,000 Euros only. Further comments on the robustness of the test will be added at the end of this section. partners can pose 'up-front', fixed costs to them. These costs could not be compensated, unless the amount of public funding is above a 'minimum efficient scale'. In other words, the subsidy should cover investment in a project that is large enough to deal with the fixed costs related to extra-regional co-operation. These might pertain to different realms, such as: covering a minimum physical distance needed to cross regional borders, having a level of R&D capacity that enables the exploration and absorption of cognitively different extra-regional knowledge, dealing with the different socio-institutional set-ups for operating in two (or more) regions (e.g., Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga 1994) . Apart from the presence of a minimum efficient scale of public funding, the 'monetary effect' of the subsidy we have discussed appears present. However, some differences emerge between the effects on co-operation with universities and research institutes. In the case of research institutes (Table 3 and Figure B1 ), an increase of the subsidy amount above the minimum threshold increasingly enhances the firm's propensity to extend its collaboration beyond regional borders (Y = 2). With Δt = 20,000, the range of the treatment effects increases from +6.4 per cent to +14 per cent. A higher amount of financial support actually seems to make extra-regional co-operation more able to span the regional boundaries and overcome the local search for research institutes. On the other hand, rather than diminishing, the propensity to co-operate locally (i.e., in the region) is left unaltered by the increase in policy intervention (that is, the outcome Y = 1 is not significantly affected by it). 18 That is to say, rather than using the policy support for shifting from intra-regional to an extra-regional co-operation with research institutes, regional firms appear more inclined to continue in their intra-regional co-operation and possibly integrate it with a more open strategy.
Adding an extra amount of treatment above the threshold enhances the firms' propensity to co-operate with extra-regional universities (Y = 2) as well: in a measure which, for an increase of 20,000 Euros, spans from +5.6 per cent to + 20.4 per cent (Table 4 and Figure B2 ). However, differently from what emerged for the collaboration with research institutes, the increasing propensity to co-operate with extra-regional academic partners (in tandem with the subsidy amount) is associated with a decreasing propensity to collaborate with a regional university (Y = 1). Above the threshold (of 180,000 Euros), an extra amount of subsidy (of 20,000 Euros) induces firms to co-operate less with regional academic partners: from -2.4 per cent to -15.9 per cent.
19 This result suggests a sort of substitution effect, between an 'inward-looking' and an 'outward-looking' co-operation strategy in the case of universities.
The fact that we observe this substitution only for universities can have different explanations. On the one hand, the number of universities outside the region that firms consider suitable substitutes of regional ones could be higher than that of research institutes. On the other hand, the result can find explanation in the relationship between the knowledge produced by regional and extra-regional research organizations. Perhaps more so than research institutes, universities operate in an homogeneous framework made of grids of internationally codified scientific fields, peer-review systems and incentives to carry out research in certain scientific areas. In particular, research priorities and themes are defined on the basis of evaluation criteria and funding mechanisms that supersede the regional level. 20 As a consequence, regional universities are likely to offer analytical knowledge which is not too dissimilar -at least in terms of breadthfrom that available through co-operation with extra-regional academic partners. However, when the search for academic research capabilities is not regionally confined, the probability of finding more suitable, newer or more diverse knowledge outside the region obviously increases (Belussi et al. 2010; D'Este and Iammarino 2010; Laursen et al. 2011) . Accordingly, once public funding allows firms to deal with higher costs, they can substitute regional co-operation with extra-regional, if they find it strategically convenient.
From a RIS perspective as well, this result is extremely relevant. On the one hand, to the extent that it increases extra-regional co-operation with universities, the policy has a potential impact on the renewal of the regional knowledge base. However, this could come at the cost of reduced region-specific interactive learning between firms and local universities, possibly resulting in a decreasing internal cohesion of the system.
We should note in conclusion that the obtained results are largely robust across the Δt values that we have selected. 21 In order to carry out a further robustness check, we have re-run the previous analysis by employing a different type of 'treatment'. Instead of the actual amount of the subsidy, we have used the intensity of the subsidy: that is, the ratio between the subsidy and 18 Although with a different threshold value (i.e., 180,000 rather than 200,000 Euros), and with a different range of treatment effects for Y = 2 (that is from +9.7% to +30.1%) the results we have obtained concerning interaction with research institutes are confirmed for Δt = 40,000 Euros.
19 These results as well are robust with Δt = 40,000 Euros, although with a different threshold (160,000 Euros), and different ranges in the effect for Y = 2 (from +7% to +39.1%) and for Y = 1 (from −8.6% to −32.8%).
20 A notable example for the Italian case is the formalization of the evaluation criteria defined by ANVUR (i.e., the national agency for the evaluation of the university system). Similarly, supra-regional definition of priorities for academic research may come from funding schemes at national (e.g., FIRB, PRIN) and EU levels (e.g., FP7, ERC grants). 21 The evidence emerging from estimates which employ Δt values of 1.00 Euro and 1,000 Euros has not been illustrated for the sake of conciseness. These additional amounts of subsidy can be considered quite small when compared to the cost of establishing and managing co-operation with a research organization. Accordingly, we could the total amount of the funded project. However, results show that this is neither particularly meaningful nor a viable way to proceed in the context of our empirical application. Given the design of the considered policy intervention, which supported the different types of firms' expenditures in fixed percentages, the ratio between the subsidy and the total project amount turns out to be extremely concentrated (for example, 65% of the observations have a subsidy intensity ratio between 35% -45%). This quite low variability made the estimation of the GPS (i.e., the first step of the procedure described in Appendix A) unfeasible.
Finally, our evidence can also be considered robust to the potentially concurring effects of other policy interventions which the firms in our sample might have benefited from. In the absence of proper data, we cannot econometrically control for this potential bias. However, some qualitative evidence suggests that this distortion is not a major concern for our empirical application. Throughout the course of a semi-structured interview, key informants of regional policy-makers confirmed that the vast majority of SMEs funded by the subsidy (the main policy target, see Table B1 ) did not apply for other R&D funding schemes. At the same time, they also reported that other firms, not necessarily SMEs, resorted to regional funding because they were unable to access other subsidy schemes (for example, because the relative calls for applications were already closed).
Conclusions
Increasing industry-research co-operation is an important objective to be pursued by policymakers. Within the region, it helps strengthen the knowledge base, which becomes available to local firms. Across regional boundaries, it allows firms to tap into different sources of knowledge in order to subsequently propose novel business solutions in the region. The econometric analysis conducted on a sample of manufacturing firms located in the ER region in Italy shows some interesting results. An R&D subsidy which provides a certain amount of support for collaboration with research partners (universities and research institutes), but leaves the beneficiaries with some degree of freedom in the decision to engage in this type of co-operation, appears quite effective in activating industry-research co-operation.
At the outset, supported firms actually make use of this opportunity. This suggests that the policy can attenuate the costs posed by the barriers to industry-research co-operation, which are implied by different gaps in the proximity between firms and research organizations. Therefore, regional policy-makers can have an important role in addressing this potential RIS failure, which also affects a medium-high innovative region like ER. This result is expected to also hold true in other, less innovative regional contexts and/or in which an attitude favourable towards co-operation is less diffuse. In these latter cases, further, not necessarily financial, support could be needed and provided through 'softer' policy interventions (e.g., sharing of best practices).
A second insight emerging from our analysis is that the simple receipt of an R&D subsidy induces local firms to increase their co-operation with research partners more within the region, than across its boundaries. This suggests that the manifold proximity which characterizes regional collaborations affects the costs and the priority that the local firms attach to their co-operative projects. Apparently, the simple provision of an R&D subsidy (i.e., its 'administration effect') is not capable of inducing a firm to opt for extra-regional partnerships as much as it is of fostering intra-regional co-operation.
Finally, our evidence has shown that the amount of a subsidy (i.e., its 'monetary effect') can play a role in this respect instead. A minimum threshold of policy intervention appears necessary expect that they are not able to have economically meaningful impacts. The results, available upon request, confirm this expectation. Even if consistent with those presented in terms of (thresholds of) significance, the treatment effects are indeed very low in terms of magnitude. for firms to overcome the possible presence of indivisible fixed costs in extra-regional co-operation. Beyond such a minimum threshold, an additional amount of subsidy increases firms' propensity to engage in more costly extra-regional co-operation, through which they can access different knowledge and obtain new ideas for their innovations. This result presumably applies to an even greater extent to regions, whose knowledge base is not that reliant on local learning mechanisms and is therefore more dependent on external knowledge for innovation.
The possibility that extra-regional co-operation occurs at the expense of intra-regional co-operation is another important issue. Our application shows that the nature of the partner is a relevant aspect in the possible shift from an inward to an outward co-operative strategy. As stated above, this occurs regarding firms' co-operation with universities, but not with research institutes. Part of the explanation relies in the relative availability of the two kinds of partners, within and outside the region concerned. However, the different kind of knowledge that these two different realities contribute to producing is another general aspect which helps account for this discrepancy.
These results have some important policy implications. First, our evidence suggests that small-scale subsidies, which just partially contribute to the fixed costs of extra-regional co-operation, would not affect the decision of the recipient firms to co-operate across the region. Hence, investigating a minimum scale which would allow extra-regional co-operation to represent an effective option for local firms, and consequently devising a consistent contribution, becomes an important task for regional policy-makers. An accurate 'screening' of the extraregional research organizations the supported firms decide to co-operate with in the R&D project supported by the policy would seemingly be important. Indeed, with respect to some research partners (universities, in our case), this policy might trigger a side-(substitution) effect that would end up making regional research organizations less pivotal for the development of regional innovations.
The results of the paper are not without limitations. First of all, panel data would have allowed us to control for firms' unobservable characteristics related to innovation and co-operation attitudes that our dataset does not account for. Second, results are inevitably sensitive to the characteristics of the context and policy that we have considered. The fact that SMEs were the main beneficiaries of the intervention -though support was also granted to large firms -and the low level of the average public funding, are just two examples. On the other hand, the results of the present study also have a general value, once the interplay between regional proximities and research co-operation can be identified in similar policy initiatives. The original methodology which we have suggested for addressing the 'monetary effect' of the subsidy could be applied in other regional contexts to further generalize our findings, disentangling potential regional specificities.
Appendix A

Econometric appendix
Three-step estimation strategy for GPS In step 1, the conditional distribution of the treatment, Ti, given the covariates, Xi, is estimated, by assuming it -or a suitable transformation of it g(Ti) -normally distributed:
where h (γ , Xi) is a function of the covariates which depends on a vector of parameters, γ, and g(Ti) is a logarithmic transformation of the treatment, T.
Estimating the parameters γ and σ 2 by maximum likelihood, the GPS for each firm, i, can be obtained as:ˆˆˆˆ,
With the estimated GPS, the normality of g(Ti) and the fulfillment of the assumption on the balancing property can be tested.
In step 2, in order to 'maximize' the joint significance and the goodness of its fit, the conditional expectation of the outcome Yi, given Ti and Ri, is modelled and estimated as follows (the estimated GPS,R i , is used):
The last step of the procedure consists of estimating the treatment effect of an additional amount of subsidy, obtaining the standard errors through a bootstrapping procedure. Given the parameters estimated in the previous stage, the average potential outcome at level t of treatment is given by:
The treatment effect for each relevant level of the treatment, t, is calculated as the difference between Equation (A4), at level t +Δt, and Equation (A4) at t. Extra-region
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